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SUITS BY STATES WITHIN THE ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT*
C. FERREL HEADY, JR.t
The orginal jurisdiction of the United States- Supreme Court
does not embrace the consideration and adjustment of every
possible type of conflict of state powers which one of the states
may seek to bring to its attention, although a perusal of the
constitutional language1 alone might lead one to that conclusion.2
The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may not be in-
voked in every cause in which a state elects to make itself a party
plaintiff.3 Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over an
action brought by a state depends upon whether the action in-
volves a "case" or "controversy" within the meaning of the con-
stitutional provision as it is interpreted by the Supreme Court.4
t Ph.D., Washington University, 1940. Research fellow, Brookings In-
stitution.
1. U. S. Const. Art. III, sec. 2: "The judicial power shall extend ***
to controversies between two or more States; * * * In all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a State
shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction."
2. Missouri v. Illinois (1901) 180 U. S. 208, 239.
3. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co. (1888) 127 U. S. 265, 287: "Notwith-
standing the comprehensive words of the Constitution, the mere fact that
a state is the plaintiff is not a conclusive test that the controversy is one
in which this court is authorized to grant relief against another state or her
citizens ** *." Massachusetts v. Mellon (1923) 262 U. S. 447, 480.
4. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts (U. S. 1838) 12 Pet. 657, 721.
* This article is an abridgment of the first chapter of a dissertation on
Justiciable Conflicts of State Powers under the Constitution, presented at
Washington University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
The term "conflicts of state powers" embraces all types of interstate
disturbances traceable to state action of a governmental character. Such
conflicts of state powers may be direct controversies between states them-
selves; they may involve action by one state of such a character as to
threaten or injure the welfare and prosperity of inhabitants of other states,
indirectly affecting those states in their governmental capacities; they may
arise from the exercise of governmental power by more than one state,
with consequences inimical to an individual or group of individuals, even
though no state considers itself injured in its governmental capacity either
directly or indirectly.
There are many possible methods for the adjustment of conflicts of
state powers, including the creation of new governmental machinery espe-
cially designed to deal with interstate relations, reorganization on a regional
basis, voluntary efforts at interstate cooperation, the employment of com-
pacts between states, and the enactment of uniform or reciprocal legisla-
tion. Among these available methods is that of the adjustment of such
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MEANING OF "CASE" OR "CONTROVERSY"
The criteria by which the Supreme Court determines whether
it has jurisdiction of an action brought by a state are set forth
nowhere in precise terms. Although statements of general guid-
ing principles appear frequently, the factors which seem to be
determinative vary with the circumstances of the case at hand.
Suits seeking to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court are relatively infrequent, and the points thus far pricked
out by the process of judicial inclusion and exclusion are not
spaced closely enough to fill in all the gaps and make an unbroken
line of demarcation.
Controversies between sovereign states may be settled by
diplomatic negotiation or, that failing, by force. When the pre-
viously sovereign American states relinquished their sovereign
powers in adopting the Constitution, they were denied resort to
the means ordinarily open to sovereign states for the settlement
of disputes between them. In order to replace these lost facilities,
the Constitution provided that the states might, with the consent
of Congress, enter into compacts to settle such disputes, 5 or that
they might ini oke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.6 Since the latter provision was intended to serve as a
substitute for the powers of diplomacy and of waging warfare
which had been surrendered by the states upon their entrance
into the Union, the Supreme Court, in determining the extent of
5. Art. I, sec. 10.
6. Art. III, sec. 2.
conflicts by the federal courts in cases brought within the federal juris-
diction. The dissertation is a study of the possibilities and limitations ofjudicial adjustment of conflicts of state powers.
Since, under the Constitution, only a limited number of conflicts of state
powers are justiciable, the scope of judicial adjustment is severely re-
stricted. Among the primary constitutional sanctions of the judicial adjust-
ment of such conflicts is the clause conferring original jurisdiction upon
the Supreme Court in cases in which a state is a party. This article is
confined to the adjustment of conflicts of state powers in suits by states
within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
In efforts to adjust conflicts of state powers, however, the Supreme
Court has made use of other Constitutional provisions as well. Of these,
the most significant are the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and the interstate commerce clause. Of particular interest is the
use by the Supreme Court of the due process clause as a means of attack-
ing the problem of double state taxation through the imposition of Consti-
tutional limitations which extend beyond recognized common law restric-
tions upon state jurisdiction to tax. This series of decisions demonstrates
the practical difficulties, and indicates the Constitutional implications, of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol26/iss1/2
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its original jurisdiction over controversies between states, has
said that that jurisdiction is limited to disputes which are prop-
erly the subject of diplomatic adjustment between independent
states.7
Even a matter in controversy between states such as might be
the subject of diplomatic negotiation between sovereign states
may not be brought before the Supreme Court for settlement
under its original jurisdiction, unless the matter is in itself
properly justiciable. True, the Supreme Court acts as a sub-
stitute for the use of diplomacy, but it remains a judicial tribu-
nal. Unless the subject matter of the controversy is susceptible
of judicial solution, the Supreme Court will not take jurisdiction
of a dispute between states, any more than another court would
take jurisdiction of a suit between private parties involving a
non-justiciable dispute. For a state to invoke the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction, it must show that it will sustain
7. North Dakota v. Minnesota (1923) 263 U. S. 365, 372, 373: "Thejurisdiction and procedure of this court in controveries between states of
the Union differ from those which it pursues in suits between private
parties. This grows out of the history of the creation of the power, in that
it was conferred by the Constitution as a substitute for the diplomatic
settlement of controversies between sovereigns and a possible resort to force.
The jurisdiction is therefore limited generally to disputes which, between
states entirely independent, might be properly the subject of diplomatic
adjustment." See also Missouri v. Illinois (1901) 180 U. S. 208, 241; Mis-
souri v. Illinois (1906) 200 U. S. 496, 518; Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
Co. (1907) 206 U. S. 230, 237; Kansas v. Colorado (1902) 185 U. S. 125,
141, 143; Wyoming v. Colorado (1922) 259 U. S. 419, 464; Pennsylvania
v. West Virginia (1923) 262 U. S. 553, 592; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts
(U. S. 1838) 12 Pet. 657, 720.
resort to the judicial process for the solution of such a complicated prob-
lem of interstate relations. The interstate commerce clause has served to
invalidate many types of state legislation setting up obstacles to trade
with other states, discriminating against industries located without the
state, or designed to preserve natural resources for the exclusive use of
the inhabitants of the state. In a series of recent cases, however, the inter-
state commerce clause has been invoked with only partial success in at-
tempts to strike down the increasing number of trade barriers erected be-
tween states during the last decade.
Subsidiary possibilities for the judicial adjustment of conflicts of state
powers have been or conceivably may be provided by means of the full
faith and credit clause, the privileges and immunities clause, and the equal
protection of the laws clause.
The record of judicial adjustment of conflicts of state powers throughjusticiable conflicts brought within the federal jurisdiction indicates that,
although there is a restricted area in which its utility is demonstrable, the
compass of its practicable operation is limited, and reliance upon it is likely
to diminish with the gradual perfection of more efficient methods of adjust-
ment.
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some special and peculiar injury, such as would enable a private
person to maintain a similar action in another court.,
Suits Involving Property Rights
If a state can show that its property or pecuniary rights are
directly involved, the Supreme Court will take jurisdiction over
an action brought by the state to secure adjudication of such
rights. A state may bring suit to recover a debt owed to it by
another state under a contract between the two states, or to
collect on bonds owned by it and issued by another state.10 When
the right to levy an inheritance tax against an estate is confined
to the state of the domicile of the deceased owner and each of
several states claims to have been the state of the domicile, if the
estate is insufficient to meet all the assessments, the Supreme
Court will take jurisdiction to decide as to the domicile, in order
to prevent financial loss to the state with a valid tax claim, al-
though it will not decide the question of domicile otherwise.11
A petition filed by a state for an injunction for the removal of a
bridge has been entertained upon a showing that the bridge was
an obstruction to navigation and resulted in direct injury to the
complaining state.2
The amount and kind of property right which must be at stake
is not clear. In Alabama v. Arizona,13 Alabama was denied leave
to file a bill of complaint to establish the invalidity of statutes of
other states forbidding the sale of goods produced by convict
labor. The anticipated loss to the state of an important source
of revenue was held not to present a justiciable issue.
Boundary Disputes
Questions of disputed boundary are always proper subjects of
suits between states. The contention that disputes over bounda-
8. South Carolina v. Georgia (1876) 93 U. S. 4, 14; Louisiana v. Texas
(1900) 176 U. S. 1, 18; Wisconsin v. Duluth (1878) 96 U. S. 379, 382;
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co. (U. S. 1851) 13 How.
518, 559, 560; Hans v. Louisiana (1890) 134 U. S. 1, 15; Wisconsin v. Peli-
can Insurance Co. (1888) 127 U. S. 265, 288, 289; Rhode Island v. Massa-
chusetts (U. S. 1838) 12 Pet. 657, 718; Texas v. Interstate Commerce
Commission (1922) 258 U. S. 158, 162; Massachusetts v. Mellon (1923)
262 U. S. 447, 480; Texas v. Florida (1939) 306 U. S. 398.
9. Virginia v. West Virginia (1915) 238 U. S. 202.
10. South Dakota v. North Carolina (1904) 192 U. S. 286, 318.
11. Texas v. Florida (1939) 306 U. S. 398.
12. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co. (U. S. 1851) 13
How. 518, 559, 560.
13. (1934) 291 U. S. 286, comment (1934) 20 Va. L. Rev. 909.
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ries are political questions and not susceptible of judicial solution
was heard and rejected as early as 1838.14 Similarly, a state
may sue in its capacity as quasi-sovereign, to protect its dominion
over the air and soil within its boundaries. 15
State as Parens Patriae
As parens patriae and representative of the public, a state is
considered to have such an interest in the health, comfort, and
welfare of its population, apart from the interests of the indi-
viduals affected, as to give it a right of legal action. 6 A state
has been allowed to bring suit as patens patriae and guardian
of its citizens to enjoin the discharge of noxious gases over its
territory by an industrial plant in another state,17 to restrain the
discharge of sewage into interstate waters to the detriment of
the health of its citizens, 1 to prevent the diversion of waters
flowing into the state from another state, 19 to halt the artificial
hastening of drainage into an interstate river to the injury of
lands in the plaintiff state,2: to limit the withdrawal by one state
of water from a chain of lakes bordering on several other
states, 21 and to enjoin the enforcement of a statute of another
state granting a preference to its inhabitants in the use of the
natural gas resources of the state so as to curtail the supply
available for consumption by citizens of the plaintiff state.
22
Claims of Individual Citizens
The Supreme Court will not permit a state to secure for its
citizens access to the original jurisdiction of the court by bring-
14. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts (U. S. 1838) 12 Pet. 657, 737. See
also Missouri v. Iowa (U. S. 1849) 7 How. 660; Florida v. Georgia (U. S.
1855) 17 How. 478; Alabama v. Georgia (U. S. 1860) 23 How. 505; Virginia
v. West Virginia (U. S. 1871) 11 Wall. 39; Louisiana v. Mississippi (1906)
202 U. S. 1.
15. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. (1907) 206 U. S. 230, 237.
16. New York v. New Jersey (1921) 256 U. S. 296, 301, 302; Missouri
v. Illinois (1901) 180 U. S. 208, 241; Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.
(1907) 206 U. S. 230, 237; Kansas v. Colorado (1902) 185 U. S. 125, 141-
143; Wyoming v. Colorado (1922) 259 U. S. 419, 464; Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia (1923) 262 U. S. 553, 592; North Dakota v. Minnesota (1923) 263
U. S. 365, 374.
17. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. (1907) 206 U. S. 230.
18. Missouri v. Illinois (1901) 180 U. S. 208; New York v. New Jersey
(1921) 256 U. S. 296.
19. Kansas v. Colorado (1902) 185 U. S. 125; Wyoming v. Colorado
(1922) 259 U. S. 419.
20. North Dakota v. Minnesota (1923) 263 U. S. 365.
21. Wisconsin v. Illinois (1929) 278 U. S. 367.
22. Pennslyvania v. West Virginia (1923) 262 U. S. 553.
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ing a suit in the name of the state to enforce the claims of in-
dividual citizens.2 3 The owners of state bonds, who are precluded
by the Eleventh Amendment from prosecuting suits against the
issuing state in their own names, cannot sue in the name of the
state in which they reside.24 Nor may a state sue to relieve its
citizens injured by the maladministration of the laws of an-
other state,25 to enjoin a railroad from charging illegal rates in
which the state in its governmental capacity has no interest, 8
to claim lands allegedly granted by Congress to the state as
trustee for the benefit of a railway company,27 to enjoin the
enforcement of an alleged unconstitutional act of Congress, 2 or
to seek damages for its inhabitants whose farms were damaged
and whose crops were lost by floods allegedly caused by the arti-
23. North Dakota v. Minnesota (1923) 263 U. S. 365, 375, 376: "The
right of a state as parens patriae * * * is to be differentiated from its lost
power as a sovereign to present and enforce individual claims of its citizens
as their trustee against a sister state."
24. New Hampshire v. Louisiana, New York v. Louisiana (1883) 108
U. S. 76. The legislature of New Hampshire passed an act providing for
the assignment of the defaulted obligations of other states to the state and
for an attempt to collect the claims of its citizens; a similar act was passed
in New York. The Supreme Court found that the state, in bringing suit on
these bonds against Louisiana, was "nothing more or less than a mere col-
lecting agent of the owners * * *; and while the suits are in the names of
the states, they are under the actual control of individual citizens, and are
prosecuted and carried on altogether by and for them" (p. 89). The power
of a sovereign state to enforce the monetary claims of its citizens against
another state has been given up by the states of the United States. Where
the individual owner gives the bonds outright and absolutely to the state,
however, so that the title of the state is clear, the state may sue the
issuing state to compel payment, even though the donor made the gift in
expectation that an action would be brought and in the hope that the
action might enure to his benefit as the owner of other like bonds. South
Dakota v. North Carolina (1904) 192 U. S. 286.
25. Louisiana v. Texas (1900) 176 U. S. 1. Louisiana filed a bill to
restrain the enforcement by Texas officials of a quarantine law in such a
way as to place in effect, it was alleged, an embargo on interstate commerce
between Louisiana and Texas. Emphasizing that for it to maintain juris-
diction, the controversy must be one arising directly between the two states
and not one in vindication of the grievances of particular individuals, the
Supreme Court held that the contention that the citizens of one state are
injured by the maladministration of the laws of another is not sufficient
to constitute a justiciable controversy between states. Acts of state officers
in abuse of their powers are not to be considered state action. Whether
Louisiana, as are rs patriae, might have been able to invoke the jurisdic-
tion of the Court on behalf of her citizens had Texas so authorized or con-
firmed the alleged action of her health officer as to make it her own, was
not decided.
26. Oklahoma v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. (1911) 220 U. S. 277.
27. Kansas v. United States (1907) 204 U. S. 331, 340, 341.
28. Massachusetts v. Mellon (1923) 262 U. S. 447.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol26/iss1/2
1940] ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT 67




The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court does not em-
brace the determination of political questions 0 which may be
raised in an action brought by a state.3 1 The distinction between
judicial and political questions was noted in the early case of
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts.3 2 In Georgia v. Stanton,33 the
Supreme Court dismissed for want of jurisdiction a bill to re-
strain the Secretary of War from carrying into execution the
provisions of the Reconstruction Act of 1867, on the ground that
political questions were presented for the judgment of the court.
An original suit by Massachusetts to enjoin the enforcement of
the Maternity Act passed by Congress was dismissed, the court
saying that the question presented, being political in character,
did not admit of the exercise of the judicial power.3 4
Suits to Enforce a Penal Law
A state may not maintain a suit within the original jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court to enforce a penalty for the violation
of its own laws. The Court reached this conclusion in view of the
rule that the courts of no country execute the penal laws of an-
other, and the precedents that the original jurisdiction of the
court does not extend to suits between states to compel the per-
formance of obligations which, if the states had been indepen-
dent nations, could not have been enforced judicially35
RELUCTANCE TO GRANT RELIEF
Even after it has assumed jurisdiction of a suit brought by a
state, the Supreme Court is reluctant to grant the relief prayed,
unless the circumstances are exceptional. Not every matter which
29. North Dakota v. Minnesota (1923) 263 U. S. 365, 375. The farm
owners injured had contributed to a fund used in the preparation and prose-
cution of the case, and each contributor expected to receive a share of the
damages sought in proportion to the amount of his loss.
30. For a general discussion of political questions in constitutional law,
see Post, "The Supreme Court and Political Questions," The Johns Hopkins
Univ. Studies in Hist. and Pol. Science (1936) ser. LIV, no. 4.
31. Louisiana v. Texas (1900) 176 U. S. 1, 23.
32. (U. S. 1838) 12 Pet. 657.
33. (U. S. 1867) 6 Wall. 50, 77.
34. Massachusetts v. Mellon (1923) 262 U. S. 447, 483.
35. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co. (1888) 127 U. S. 265, 288, 290; Okla-
homa ex rel. West v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. (1911) 220 U. S. 290, 298.
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would give a private person a right to recover will suffice to
warrant interference by the Supreme Court with the action of
one state at the behest of another state. Mr. Justice Holmes has
expressed the view of the court in the following language:
"the words of the Constitution would be a narrow ground
upon which to construct and apply to the relations between
states the same system of municipal law in all its details
which would be applied between individuals. * * * It may be
imagined that a nuisance might be created by a state upon a
navigable river like the Danube, which would amount to a
casus belli for a state lower down, unless removed. If such
a nuisance were created by a state upon the Mississippi the
controversy would be resolved by the more peaceful means
of a suit in this court. But it does not follow that every
matter which would warrant a resort to equity by one citizen
against another in the same jurisdiction equally would war-
rant an interference by this court with the action of a state.
* * * Before this court ought to intervene, the case should
be of serious magnitude, clearly and fully proved, and the
principle to be applied should be one which the court is pre-
pared deliberately to maintain against all considerations on
the other side."3
When, however, a state has succeeded in proving its case in a
suit in equity, the court, speaking again through Mr. Justice
Holmes, has said that "it is somewhat more certainly entitled to
specific relief than a private party might be.1 37
RIGHT OF SUPREME COURT TO ENFORCE ITS DECISION
No state has as yet refused to comply with a judgment ren-
dered against it by the Supreme Court in a controversy between
it and another state, so that there is no instance in which the
Supreme Court has acted to enforce its judgment against a state.
However, extended litigation between Virginia and West Vir-
ginia regarding a debt owed by West Virginia to Virginia elicited
from the court an expression of its right to enforce such a judg-
ment. Following delay by West Virginia in paying the sum
adjudged due to Virginia by the terms of a Supreme Court de-
cision, the Court announced that the original jurisdiction con-
36. Missouri v. Illinois (1906) 200 U. S. 496, 520, 521. See also New
York v. New Jersey (1921) 256 U. S. 296, 309; North Dakota v. Minnesota
(1923) 263 U. S. 365, 374; Alabama v. Arizona (1934) 291 U. S. 286, 291,
292.
37. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. (1907) 206 U. S. 230, 237, 238
(nuisance abatement).
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ferred upon it by the Constitution includes the power to enforce
its judgment by appropriate remedial processes, operating
where necessary upon the governmental powers and agencies of
a state."
CLASSES OF DISPUTES ADJUSTED IN CONTROVERSIES
BETWEEN STATES
Interstate Boundaries
By far the most common type of controversy submitted by
states to the Supreme Court for adjudication under its original
jurisdiction are disputes as to boundary. Approximately two-
thirds of the total number of controversies between states come
within this category. In the consideration and determination of
these cases, however, the Court ordinarily needs to devise no
novel rules of decision, but accepts and applies the principles of
international law relating to the settlement of boundary con-
troversies. Boundary questions are minor among the conflicts
of state powers of present significance-there is no doubt as to
the jurisdiction or willingness of the Supreme Court to consider
them, and their solution is only meagerly suggestive of the
Court's view in the settlement of other types of controversies
between states.
Because of their frequency, and the detailed investigatory
work involved in their solution, boundary issues make heavy de-
mands upon the time and attention of the Supreme Court. Many
of the cases appear time and again in the reports before they are
finally settled. The early dispute between Rhode Island and
Massachusetts appears eight times in the reports before the final
decision.- The boundary between Missouri and Iowa was fixed
at the middle of the nineteenth century,40 and had to be re-desig-
nated almost fifty years later because some of the boundary
markers had been obliterated in the interval and the dispute had
broken out afresh.4 1 The citations to the boundary controversy
38. Virginia v. West Virginia (1918) 246 U. S. 565, 591, 592. The satis-
faction by West Virginia of the claim against her, following this decision,
relieved the Supreme Court of the necessity of attempting to take specific
steps to compel the execution of the judgment, in accordance with the prin-
ciple thus declared.
39. (U. S. 1833) 7 Pet. 651; (U. S. 1837) 11 Pet. 226; (U. S. 1838) 12
Pet. 657; (U. S. 1838) 12 Pet. 755; (U. S. 1839) 13 Pet. 23; (U. S. 1840)
14 Pet. 210; (U. S. 1841) 15 Pet. 233; (U. S. 1846) 4 How. 591.
40. Missouri v. Iowa (U. S. 1849) 7 How. 660; (U. S. 1850) 10 How. 1.
Washington University Open Scholarship
70 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 26
between Oklahoma and Texas, disposed of in 1928, reach a
grand total of at least fifty-four.42 In numerous instances cases
have been pending well over a decade before final disposition.
Nevertheless, litigation in notable instances has failed to settle
permanently contentions between states as to boundary, and
compacts between the contending states have been resorted to
as a solution.' 3
Sewage Disposal
On two occasions a state has invoked the original jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court to enjoin another state from discharging
its sewage into interstate waters to the injury of the health and
comfort of the citizens of the plaintiff state.
In 1900 the city of Chicago began discharging its sewage
through an artificial channel into the Desplaines River, a tribu-
tary of the Illinois River, which empties into the Mississippi
above St. Louis. When Missouri sought to enjoin Illinois and
the Sanitary District of Chicago from discharging any sewage
into the artificial channel, alleging pollution of the waters of the
Mississippi River, the Supreme Court took jurisdiction of the
action.44 Five years later, in 1906, after protracted consideration
of the evidence presented, the court dismissed the bill.45
Approaching the evidence upon the presupposition that the
relief asked was not to be granted except upon the strictest proof,
the court found that the case presented by Missouri fell far below
the allegations of the bill. Missouri did not show with certainty
that the causes of infection complained of might not have come
from dangers of her own creation or at least from other sources
than the Chicago drainage canal. Until such convincing evidence
should be produced, the Supreme Court declined to intervene to
enjoin the action of Illinois.
New York and New Jersey were the disputants in a similar
controversy regarding the disposal of sewage. In 1902 New
Jersey passed an act creating the Passaic Valley Sewerage Dis-
trict, leading to the adoption of a plan for a tunnel under Newark
41. Missouri v. Iowa (1896) 160 U. S. 688; (1897) 165 U. S. 118.
42. The initial citation to this controversy is Oldahoma v. Texas (1920)
252 U. S. 372.
43. Frankfurter and Landis, "The Compact Clause of the Constitution
-A Study in Interstate Adjustments" (1925) 34 Yale L. J. 685. The Su-
preme Court has suggested this method of settlement on several occasions.
44. Missouri v. Illinois (1901) 180 U. S. 208.
45. Missouri v. Illinois (1906) 200 U. S. 496.
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Bay and the cities of Bayonne and Jersey City to a point in
Upper New York Bay, for the conveyance of sewage from the
cities along the Passaic River. Previously these populous cities
had drained their sewage into the Passaic River, causing danger-
ous pollution of the stream, eighty-four per cent of the water of
which found its way ultimately through the natural channel of
Kill van Kull, into Upper New York Bay. Conferences between
representatives of New Jersey and New York failed to produce
a mutually satisfactory course of action. As a consequence, New
York commenced a suit in 1908 before the Supreme Court to
enjoin the discharge of sewage into Upper New York Bay by the
Passaic Valley Sewerage District.
The Supreme Court again sustained the right of a state to
bring such a suit as the representative of its citizens, and again
found the evidence presented insufficient to support the injunc-
tion sought. 41 Pollution of the waters of the Bay by sewage from
sources within the state was a factor weighing against New
York. New Jersey officials were found to have proceeded with
the purpose of respecting the rights of New York. On condition
that certain methods of treatment of the sewage be used, and
the manner of dispersion at the outlet be improved, the Supreme
Court declined to issue the injunction, although the way was left
open for New York to reapply for relief should future conditions
strengthen her case enough to justify judicial interference with
the actions of New Jersey.
Interference wiith Interstate Waters
In 1902 another type of conflict of state powers involving the
use of interstate waters was presented to the Supreme Court for
consideration. Kansas filed an original bill to enjoin Colorado
from diverting the water of the Arkansas River, which flowed
through both states.47 The diverted water had been used for the
irrigation of arid land in Colorado, much of which could be re-
claimed only by the application of water from the Arkansas
River. The appropriation by Colorado naturally tended to make
the lands along the stream in Kansas less arable.
Each state pressed an extreme contention. Colorado claimed
that it had the right to appropriate all the waters of the stream
46. New York v. New Jersey (1921) 256 U. S. 296.
47. Jurisdiction was maintained by the Supreme Court in Kansas v.
Colorado (1902) 185 U. S. 125.
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for the irrigation of its soil and the improvement of its territory,
while Kansas claimed that English common law required that the
flow continue in its customary natural way, and that no portion
of it be appropriated in Colorado for the purposes of irrigation.
The Supreme Court adopted as proper the rule that one state has
the right of appropriating the waters of an interstate stream for
the purposes of irrigation, subject to the condition of an equi-
table division between the states through which the stream flows.
The appropriation of water for irrigati'on in Colorado had di-
minished the flow into Kansas, but had made possible the recla-
mation of thousands of acres of formerly barren land in Colo-
rado. Although the diminution of flow had produced perceptible
injury to portions of the Arkansas valley in Kansas, the con-
clusion of the Court was that, considering the right of each
state to receive benefit from the waters of the interstate stream,
Kansas had not made out a case entitling it to a decree. The
injunction was denied, with the proviso that Kansas might call
for relief should the depletion of the waters of the river by
Colorado continue to increase until an equitable division of bene-
fits no longer existed between the two states.48
Wyoming, in 1911, commenced a similar suit against Colorado
to prevent the proposed diversion in Colorado of part of the
waters of the Laramie River, a stream flowing from Colorado
into Wyoming. Both states had used the stream for irrigation
for many years. It was proposed, by means of the so-called
Laramie-Poudre project, to divert a large portion of the water
of the river and conduct it into another watershed, with the
result that none of the water could ever return to the stream or
reach Wyoming.
Wyoming v. Colorado differed in certain respects from the
earlier case of Kansas v. Colorado. Both Wyoming and Colorado
had adopted the doctrine of appropriation in preference to the
common law doctrine of riparian rights, whereas, in the earlier
case, one state had recognized the common law rule and one the
doctrine of appropriation. In that case, the diversion complained
of was not to a watershed from which none of the water could
find its way into the complaining state. Here it was sought to
prevent a proposed diversion for the benefit of lands as yet un-
48. Kansas v. Colorado (1907) 206 U. S. 46.
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reclaimed, whereas in the former case the challenged diversion
had been practised for years.
The doctrine of appropriation was applied by the Supreme
Court, as furnishing the most equitable basis for a settlement,
especially in view of the fact that each of the contending states
had incorporated the rule into its own constitution. Consequently
a decree was entered enjoining the diversion of more than a
specified amount of water per year from the Laramie River in
Colorado by means of the Laramie-Poudre project.4 9
A further phase of the clashing demands of the western states
for the use of the scarce waters flowing through their boundaries
appears in Arizona v. California, decided in 1931.,0 The Boulder
Canyon Project Act of 1928 was passed by Congress, author-
izing construction of a dam on the Colorado River, subject to
the terms of the Colorado River compact, an agreement for the
apportionment of the water of the river and its tributaries,
which had been drawn up by representatives from the states of
Arizona, Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, New Mexico, Nevada, and
California. The act was to become effective upon the ratification
of the compact by the legislatures of California and of at least
five of the six other states. By June, 1929, the legislatures of
all except Arizona had ratified the compact, and the act accord-
ingly was declared to be in effect. Arizona then brought an
original suit against the Secretary of the Interior and the states
of California, Nevada, Utah, New Mexico, Colorado, and Wyom-
ing to enjoin the carrying out of the Boulder Dam project.
Arizona alleged that the act interfered with its right to con-
trol additional appropriations. Approximately half of the aver-
age annual flow of the Colorado River system had been appropri-
ated by Arizona and the other states, the unappropriated flow
being then subject to appropriation in Arizona under its laws.
The Supreme Court found that the contention was based only
upon assumed potential invasions of the rights of Arizona. The
act was interpreted as not limiting the legal right of Arizona,
as long as Arizona did not accept the interstate agreement, to
appropriate any of the unappropriated flow of water. Hence
the bill was dismissed without prejudice to an application for
relief in case of future interference with the rights of Arizona.
49. Wyoming v. Colorado (1922) 259 U. S. 419.
50. 283 U. S. 423.
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An original suit was brought by North Dakota against Minne-
sota to enjoin, not the diversion of waters from, but the artificial
hastening of drainage into, an interstate river. 1 Floods caused
by an unusual rise in the level of a stream flowing from Minne-
sota into North Dakota had done widespread damage to the
lands, crops and property of Dakota farm owners. North Dakota
contended that the floods were traceable to a change in the
methods of draining water from lands within Minnesota; the
defendant state denied the allegation and attributed the flood to
unusual rainfall. The Supreme Court agreed that if the use of
artificial drainage ditches in one state increases the flow into an
interstate stream so as to flood the farms of another state, that
state has a right to seek relief from the Court by means of an
original suit against the offending state, but concluded upon the
evidence presented that Minnesota was not responsible for the
floods of which complaint was made.
The operations of the Sanitary District of Chicago, which had
been the cause of the suit between Missouri and Illinois at the
turn of the century, led to additional litigation before the Su-
preme Court almost thirty years later. In order to dilute and
carry away the sewage of Chicago, the amount of water diverted
from Lake Michigan was gradually increased until 8,500 or more
cubic feet of it per second was being allowed to flow from the
lake into the Chicago drainage canal, and thence to the Illinois
and Mississippi rivers. Wisconsin, together with Minnesota,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania, all of them affected by the diversion of
water from Lake Michigan, began an original action before the
Supreme Court to enjoin the Sanitary District of Chicago and
the state of Illinois from continuing such diversion. Michigan
and New York filed similar suits against Illinois. Missouri,
Kentucky, Tennessee, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas,
states in the Mississippi basin reluctant to see a reduction in the
amount of water entering the Mississippi River from the Illinois,
became intervening defendants. Charles Evans Hughes, as spe-
cial master for the court, reported that the diversion of water
from Lake Michigan at Chicago had lowered the levels of Lakes
Michigan, Huron, Erie, and Ontario, and of their connecting
waterways, five or six inches, with resulting damage to naviga-
51. North Dakota v. Minnesota (1923) 263 U. S. 365.
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tion and commercial interests, and to riparian property gen-
erally. The court concluded that the complainant states were
entitled to a decree, so framed as to accord to the Sanitary Dis-
trict a reasonable time to provide some other means of disposing
of the sewage and to reduce the diversion.52
Refusal of One State to Furnish Commodity
to Another State
In 1919 West Virginia passed a statute for the purpose of
reserving for the use of its own inhabitants the natural gas re-
sources of the state, permitting only surplus gas to be sent into
other states. Every pipe line company operating in the state
was required to satisfy the demands of domestic consumers first.
In 1918 approximately 69 per cent of the natural gas produced
in West Virginia was sent outside the state, principally to Penn-
sylvania and Ohio, where it was used by state and municipal
institutions as well as by domestic and industrial consumers.
Anticipating a drastic curtailment in the supply of gas available
should the statute go into operation, Pennsylvania and Ohio filed
similar suits against West Virginia before the Supreme Court,
seeking to enjoin enforcement of the statute on the ground that
it constituted an unconstitutional interference with interstate
commerce.
The Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction,"3 holding that the
complainant state had a right to sue to protect its own proprie-
tary interest and as representative of the consuming public. Upon
the authority of the earlier case of West v. Kansas Natural Gas
Co.,5' the transmission from one state to another of natural gas
was termed interstate commerce, and the enforced withdrawal
for the benefit of local consumers of a large volume of gas from
an established interstate current, by a state law according to
52. Wisconsin v. Illinois (1929) 278 U. S. 367. The decree subsequently
rendered enjoined the defendants from diverting water in excess of an
annual average of 6,500 cubic feet per second after July 1, 1930, with grad-
ual reductions in the withdrawals permitted to an amount not in excess of
1,500 cubic feet per second after December 31, 1938, required the filing of
semi-annual reports by the defendants, and provided that any of the parties
might apply for appropriate relief when necessary. Wisconsin v. Illinois
(1930) 281 U. S. 179.
53. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, Ohio v. West Virginia (1923) 262
U. S. 553. Justices Brandeis, Holmes, and McReynolds, contended that the
Court had no jurisdiction.
54. (1911) 221 U. S. 229, 255.
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consumers within the state a preferred right of purchase over
consumers in other states, was held a forbidden interference
with interstate commerce. 55
Determination of Domicile for Taxation Purposes
After the Supreme Court, early in the 1930's, announced that
thenceforward only the state of the domicile of a deceased owner
might levy inheritance taxes upon the transfer of intangible
personalty, in numerous instances more than one state claimed
to have been the state of the owner's domicile. Litigation was
resorted to in an effort to gain a judicial determination as td
which of two or more such competing claims was valid. In the
course of a prolonged campaign to get the Supreme Court to
decide between the conflicting claims of New Jersey and Penn-,
sylvania as to domicile in connection with inheritance taxation
of the Dorrance estate, an original proceeding was brought by
New Jersey against Pennsylvania to determine the taxing rights
of the two states. The Supreme Court refused to take jurisdic-
tion.58
When, however, an original suit in the nature of a bill of
interpleader was brought by Texas against Florida, New York,
and Massachusetts to determine the true domicile of Edward
H. R. Green in order to decide between the rival claims of the
four states for death taxes upon his estate, jurisdiction was up-
held by the Supreme Court, in a decision announced in 1939.61
This case differed from the previous one in that, whereas the
Dorrance estate had been ample to meet the tax demands of
both New Jersey and Pennsylvania, the Green estate was not
sufficient to pay the aggregate amount of the taxes claimed by
the four states and by the federal government, so that the right
of either Texas or one of the other states might have been de-
feated unless the Supreme Court stepped in. Terming the case
"exceptional in its circumstances and in the principles of law
applicable to them, all uniting to impose a risk of loss upon the
state lawfully entitled to collect the tax,"58 the Supreme Court
agreed to settle the question of domicile in this instance.
55. 262 U. S. 553, 596, 597.
56. New Jersey v. Pennsylvania (1933) 287 U. S. 580.
57. Texas v. Florida (1939) 306 U. S. 398. Justices Frankfurter and
Black argued that the Court should not take jurisdiction.
58. 306 U. S. 398, 411.
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Enforcement of Contracts and Compacts between States
With the increasing use of interstate compacts in dealing with
complex aspects of interstate relations, differences of construc-
tion are likely to arise between the contracting states, and resort
to the Supreme Court for authoritative interpretation and effec-
tive enforcement of contracts and compacts between states may
be expected. The authority of the Supreme Court to enforce a
compact between states was confirmed in the lengthy litigation
between Virginia and West Virginia for the collection of a debt
owed by the latter state to the former.59 In 1930, in an original
suit brought by Kentucky against Indiana for specific perform-
ance of a contract for the building of a bridge across the Ohio
River, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its authority with respect
to a contract between states, to determine all questions pertain-
ing to the obligations of the contract.60
EVALUATION OF SUITS BETWEEN STATES AS MEANS OF
ADJUSTMENT OF CONFLICTS OF STATE POWERS
An evaluation of the practical utility of suits between states
as a means of adjustment of conflicts of state powers calls for
consideration of the willingness of the Supreme Court to decide
disputes between states, of the past record of adjustment of con-
flicts of state powers by this means, and of available alternative
methods of settlement the use of which might obviate resort to
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
In addition to the strictness with which it has interpreted the
meaning of "case" or "controversy" in determining whether it
might assume jurisdiction of an original action brought by a
state, and the reluctance with which it grants relief even after
jurisdiction is maintained, the Supreme Court has frequently
urged states bringing disputes before it to adjust their differ-
ences by other means than a resort to the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court.62 These official misgivings about the advisa-
59. See Virginia v. West Virginia (1907) 206 U. S. 290; (1911) 220
U. S. 1; (1915) 238 U. S. 202; (1918) 246 U. S. 565.
60. Kentucky v. Indiana (1930) 281 U. S. 163, 176.
61. For example, in New York v. New Jersey (1921) 256 U. S. 296, 313:
"We cannot withhold the suggestion, inspired by the consideration of this
case, that the grave problem of sewage disposal presented by the large and
growing populations living on the shores of New York bay is one more
likely to be wisely solved by co-operative study and by conference and
mutual concession on the part of representatives of the states so vitally
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bility of resort to a suit between states before the Supreme Court
for the adjustment of many types of conflicts of state powers
were repeated by Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion
in Texas v. Florida:
"The authority which the Constitution has committed to
this Court over 'Controversies between two or more States,'
serves important ends in the working of our federalism.
But there are practical limits to the efficacy of the adjudica-
tory process in the adjustment of interestate controversies.
The limitations of litigation-its episodic character, its
necessarily restricted scope of inquiry, its confined regard
for considerations of policy, its dependence on the contingen-
cies of a particular record, and other circumscribing factors
-often denature and even mutilate the actualities of a prob-
lem and thereby render the litigious process unsuited for its
solution. 862
Such considerations as these have led a minority of the court
to advocate a much narrower range for the original jurisdiction
of the Court, and to oppose assumption of jurisdiction where the
circumstances are such that the Supreme Court, because of such
factors as those noted above, would be unable to grant appropri-
ate relief. In Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, Justice Brandeis,
dissenting, contended that jurisdiction should be denied because
it was not shown that there was, in a legal sense, danger of in-
vasion of the alleged rights of the complaining state, and because
there was a fatal lack of necessary parties, in that the companies
exporting gas from West Virginia were not represented. But
even if all the other obstacles could be overcome, he was of the
opinion that the Court should still dismiss the bills, "because it
would be unable to grant the only relief appropriate. '83 Where
the matter involved was the right of West Virginia to restrict
the exportation of natural gas produced within its borders, the
most that the Court should do, he thought, would be to compel
West Virginia to share its production equitably with the other
states dependent upon it for a part of their gas supply. However,
in order to determine what would be equitable, or what part of
the West Virginia production that state might retain and what
interested in it than by proceedings in any court, however constituted." See
also Washington v. Oregon (1908) 214 U. S. 205, 218; Minnesota v. Wiscon-
sin (1920) 252 U. S. 273.
62. (1939) 306 U. S. 398, 428.
63. (1923) 262 U. S. 553, 618.
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part it must allow to be exported, it would be necessary to explore
the resources and needs of all the states concerned. Inquiry into
the potential as well as actual production in each state, and the
actual and potential demand in each state, would be essential.
Moreover, no determination as to any of these matters could
afford a stable basis for future action, for none of these factors
would be constant. Only the informed judgment of a board of
experts could make decisions of the character called for to
achieve the continuous equitable division of the available gas
production among consumers in the various states. Since the
Supreme Court was unequipped to undertake the determinations
required for a proper settlement of such a dispute, it should, in
the opinion of Justice Brandeis, have refused to entertain the suit
altogether.
Justice Frankfurter, in a dissenting opinion concurred in by
Justice Black, expressed a similar view in opposing the assump-
tion of jurisdiction in Texas v. Florida, involving the determina-
tion of domicile for inheritance tax purposes. The common law
doctrine of a single domiciliary status, he argued, is inadequate
to present circumstances. On the other hand, he continued,
"it is not for this Court in these cases of multiple residences
to evolve new taxing policies based on more equitable con-
siderations than the all-or-nothing consequence of the old
domiciliary rule. * * * merely because no other means than -
litigation have as yet been evolved to adjust the conflicting
claims of several states in a single estate is not sufficient
reason for utilizing as a basis of our jurisdiction over-
simplified formulas of the past that have largely lost their
relevance in the contemporary context. ''64
Whether the Supreme Court takes jurisdiction of a controversy
between states and then declines to formulate a settlement, or
refuses to maintain jurisdiction at all, makes relatively little
difference insofar as the utility of this method of adjustment of
conflicts of state powers is concerned. In either instance, a dis-
pute between states of sufficient magnitude to induce one of them
to seek a solution in the courts is left unsettled. The construction
of the constitutional term "case" or "controversy" markedly
narrowed resort to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court as a method of adjustment. The extra burden of proof im-
64. (1939) 306 U. S. 398, 430, 431.
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posed as a prerequisite to the granting of the relief asked in a
controversy between states diminished still further the useful-
ness of such suits for the adjustment of conflicts of state powers.
If to these restrictions should be added the further condition, as
is suggested by the opinions of Justices Brandeis and Frank-
furter, that jurisdiction be refused by the Supreme Court if it
conceives itself unprepared to formulate and effectuate a satis-
factory solution, the availability of resort to a suit between
states will be cut down still further.
Actually, the main concern of the justices dissenting in both
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia and Texas v. Florida was not over
the assumption of jurisdiction, but over the law applied by the
majority after the jurisdiction of the court had been sustained.
Their argument against the assumption of jurisdiction is really
part of a wider protest against the principles followed by the
majority in reaching the decision announced for the court. If
the majority had merely assumed jurisdiction, and had then de-
cided that the relief asked ought not to be granted, perhaps the
protests registered against the maintenance of jurisdiction
would have remained unwritten.
The intimations to the effect that the Supreme Court should
refuse even to take jurisdiction in a controversy for which it
would be unable to provide the desirable remedy, although a
matter of an otherwise justiciable nature was presented, are
open to question. The view of the dissenting justices is based
upon the recognition that, in the handling of such a complex and
shifting interstate problem as that involved in the West Virginia
case, other preferable means of solution might be developed and
used, and that any settlement attempted by the Supreme Court
would prove inadequate in the long run. The hope is that, by
slamming the door of its original jurisdiction to states seeking
settlement of such problems, the Supreme Court may force them
to experiment with other possible solutions until they evolve a
thoroughly adequate means of adjustment. Experience has indi-
cated, it is true, that the states will run to the Supreme Court
to tell their troubles, if the court will listen, rather than work
out an equitable settlement themselves, and this even when the
process is costly both in time and money, and the results often
not conclusive. It is more than likely, also, that a suit between
states is not the most efficient means of adjusting such conflicts,
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and that non-judicial arrangements would provide preferable
results. Possibly the development of alternative methods of ad-
justing conflicts of state powers would actually be stimulated
should the Supreme Court officially embrace such a doctrine as
to the scope of its original jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, contrary considerations are persuasive. The de-
vice of a suit between states within the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court was intended to provide a peaceful means for
the authoritative settlement of disputes between states. The
grant of jurisdiction is not, in its terms, restrictive. Limitations
imposed by interpretation close this avenue of adjustment. Con-
flicts of state powers inadmissible to judicial consideration must
be adjusted otherwise or not at all. A decision handed down by
the Supreme Court is binding upon the states which are parties
to the suit, but non-judicial adjustment depends upon the agree-
ment of each of the states involved, and consequently is less
easily achieved. Rather than close its original jurisdiction to
contending states when the problem is such that litigation is not
the best means of solution, the Supreme Court should be re-
luctant to restrict further the range of its jurisdiction over
suits between states, even though by so doing it might in some
degree expedite the use of other methods of adjustment.
The types of conflicts of state powers adjusted in suits be-
tween states have not been many. The impossibility of bringing
many types of conflicts within the confines of the constitutional
term "case" or "controversy" has excluded many problems from
judicial consideration. Other types have come within the orig-
inal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court but have gone unadjusted
because the complainant state failed to adduce the incontroverti-
ble proof required for the grant of judicial relief against an-
other state.
Of the cases decided by the Supreme Court within its original
jurisdiction, many concerned matters which might have been
adjusted in a more satisfactory manner by the states acting in
an extra-judicial way. Boundary disputes are probably as sus-
ceptible of judicial settlement as any other type, but often judi-
cial decision proves an expensive, long drawn out, and incon-
clusive method of drawing a boundary line. In both of the
instances in which one state has sued another to prevent the
discharge of sewage into interstate waters, the Supreme Court
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has found the evidence not conclusive enough to grant the injunc-
tion sought by the plaintiff state, although it recognized that
such a problem as that of sewage disposal demanded some kind
of agreement to reconcile the conflicting interests of the con-
tending states. The equitable distribution of the limited supply
of water available in many of the western states is a matter of
vital concern to those states, and makes it imperative that a bind-
ing apportionment be made. Such division of water supply has
been made by the Supreme Court in a few instances, not always
with complete success.6 5 The use of an interstate compact to
apportion the water of the Colorado River suggests that this de-
vice may prove more satisfactory. When it forbade one state
absolutely to preserve for its own citizens the preference in the
use of its natural gas resources, the Supreme Court, although it
assured the continued supply of gas for consumption in the com-
plaining states until the fields were exhausted, failed to formu-
late a scheme which would have given due regard to the rights
of each of the states concerned, by an equitable apportionment of
the limited supply of gas remaining available for consumption.
The decree of the Supreme Court ordering a sharp reduction in
the amount of water allowed to be diverted from Lake Michigan
by Chicago has not settled satisfactorily and probably not finally
a problem of vital concern to all of the states bordering the Great
Lakes and the states of the Mississippi basin.s The shortcom-
ings of litigation for coping with these intricate and shifting
problems has been amply demonstrated by the decisions, and has
65. On March 4, 1940, the Supreme Court permitted Wyoming to file a
petition seeking to have Colorado held in contempt for the alleged excessive
use of water from the Laramie River, and directed Colorado to show
cause by March 25 why it should not be held in contempt for violation of
the previous Supreme Court decree setting a limit to the use of water by
Colorado. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, March 4, 1940, p. 4A: 4. The petition
filed by Wyoming was denied by the Supreme Court on April 22, 1940. It
was not controverted that Colorado had permitted diversion in excess of the
amount allowed in 1939. Colorado insisted, however, that the excess diver-
sion was with the acquiescence of Wyoming. Stating that it appeared that
there was misunderstanding and uncertainty as to this point, the SupremeCourt let Colorado off with a warning to stay within its allotment in the
future. Wyoming v. Colorado (1940) 310 U. S. 656.
66. In March, 1940, the Supreme Court heard a plea by Illinois for a
temporary modification of the Court's earlier order to permit an increase
in diversion of water from Lake Michigan to 5,000 cubic feet per second
from the existing flow of 1,500 cubic feet, until Dec. 31, 1942. Six statesjoined Illinois in asking for the modification. Six other states expressed
opposition. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, March 26, 1940, p. 1B: 1.
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been repeatedly admitted by members of the Supreme Court
itself.
The lessons of experience may induce states to compose many
of their differences by devices other than that of a suit between
states within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Perhaps the interstate compact will prove to be the instrument
of greatest aptitude for the non-judicial adjustment of conflicts
of state powers. In a relatively few types of controversies, a
suit before the Supreme Court may be the most suitable possible
means of solution. In most instances, however, the settlement
of conflicts of state powers by some form of interstate coopera-
tion bears greater promise. Nevertheless, recognition of its
shortcomings ought not to lead to withdrawal of the availability
of the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for the adjust-
ment of conflicts of state powers. At least, the construction of
the meaning of "case" or "controversy" should not be narrowed
so as to exclude all disputes between states which the Supreme
Court may not be able to settle decisively. Desirable though it
may be to adjust many types of conflicts of state powers without
litigation, the constitutional provision for suits between states
within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court presents a
last resort for the adjustment of interstate controversies even
when the process of litigation is ill-suited for their solution.
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